Publication – Monograph

China, India and Russia – Cooperation and Construction of the Asia-Pacific Order in the 21st Century, LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, October 2009

Abstract:
This study examines the interactions between China, India and Russia as they are the major powers to construct the Asia-Pacific order in the 21st century. It studies the three countries’ divergent and convergent interests in order to uncover their concerns and incentives. It further identifies the Asia-Pacific order that China, India and Russia want to build, as well as the measures they have taken to alter the existing Asia-Pacific order. Three constraining forces form the key guiding regularities of the Asia-Pacific order. First, regional institutions such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Six-Party Talks constrain the influence of China, India, Russia and the United States. Second, China, India and Russia jointly or independently constrain American hegemony in pursuing non-interventionist norms and challenging the norms of nuclear non-proliferation. Third, Indian and Russian hedging policies not only weaken the American hegemonic influence, but also limit China’s rising influence.

Publication – Journal Paper

“Re-interpreting China’s non-intervention policy towards Myanmar: Leverage, interests and intervention”, (with Yongnian Zheng), Journal of Contemporary China, vol.18, iss.61, 2009

Abstract:
China’s non-intervention policy has long been criticized for prolonging the rule of many authoritarian regimes. Myanmar has become one of the classic examples. As China is expected to become a responsible great power, her behavioral patterns have aroused many concerns. This paper aims to re-interpret China’s non-intervention policy. While explaining various constraints on China’s capability to intervene in the Myanmar government, it shows how China is making efforts to seek a new intervention policy in dealing with countries like Myanmar. It argues that China’s insistence on a non-intervention policy does not mean that China does not want to influence other countries such as Myanmar. To assess Chinese leverage and its non-intervention policy toward Myanmar as well as to supplement the current limited academic discussion on Sino-Myanmar relations, in this paper we first examine Chinese leverage in Myanmar through Burmese local politics, such as the power struggle between the central government and local rebel governments. Second, we disaggregate the Chinese interests in Myanmar into different levels (regional, geo-strategic and international) and discuss how these interests affect China’s non-intervention policy. Third, we argue that China has indeed tried to intervene in Myanmar politics, but in a softer manner that contrasts with the traditional Western hard interventions, such as economic sanctions and military interference.

Conference Paper

“Two key stumbling blocks for Hong Kong’s democratization: Personal vote and Beijing’s policies”, International Conference on Political Parties, Party Systems and Democratization in East Asia, jointly organized by Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung & East Asian Institute, 13 August 2009, Singapore

Abstract:
Hong Kong has a high standard of socio-economic development with an effective government system and a solid foundation of rule of law. However, the democratization process in Hong Kong remains dull. This paper suggests that there are two key stumbling blocks for Hong Kong’s democratization. First, many political parties in Hong Kong have been focusing on providing constituency services in order to build up personal relations with voters, often resulting in votes for the candidate rather than for the party. This phenomenon not only undermines the proper role of the Legislative Council, but also the process of democratization. Second, Beijing’s economic, institutional and cultural policies have offered Hong Kong people a great materialistic support, especially during the economic downturns. By easing the general discontent among Hong Kong people and creating a stable and harmonious political climate, Beijing plays an important role in diluting the demand for democratization in Hong Kong.

For more information: http://www.nus.edu.sg/NUSinfo/EAI/august.pdf

Publication – Policy Paper

“Assessing China’s influence in Central Asia: A dominant regional power?” (with Zhengxu Wang), China Briefing Series, Issue 53, July 2009.

Executive Summary:

• China has greatly increased its trade and energy investments in Central Asia since the 1990s. Whether China’s influence in the region has increased becomes an important question.
• The Xinjiang province has figured prominently in China’s Central Asia strategies. Trade between Xinjiang and Central Asian countries increased 130 percent in the first year after the end of the Soviet Union.
• In 2005, Xinjiang accounted for 40 percent of the total volume of trade between China and the five Central Asian countries-Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
• Overall, China’s trade with Central Asia remains small relative to its trade with other Asian neighbors, as well as compared to Russia’s trade with Central Asia.
• China is interested in exploring oil and natural gas in Central Asia to diversify its energy sources. In coming years several major deals will see large increases in oil and gas exports to China from Central Asia.
• But Russia and European Union are also heavily involved in the energy game in Central Asia, greatly offsetting China’s influences. Russia’s Gazprom, for example, has a monopoly control over Central Asia’s natural gas exports.
• Despite China’s rebuff, US troops maintain their presence in Central Asia. China’s attempts to collaborate with Central Asia in cracking down extremism, separatism and terrorism in the region have not always been successful.
• Drug trafficking is another non-traditional security challenge China faces in Central Asia. Reported opium seizures in Tajikistan increased by 83% in 2007, and almost 47 metric tons of precursor chemicals used to produce morphine and heroin were seized in the region in 2008.
• China’s efforts in engaging Central Asia are anchored in The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), formed by China, Russia, and the four Central Asian Republics. China treats the organisation as a testing ground for establishing cordial post-Cold War international relations.
• But the Central Asian countries give higher priority to the Commonwealth of Independent States and the West rather than to China in forming their foreign policies. The SCO still falls short of becoming a powerful vehicle.
• Chinese soft power is weak in the region, one Kazakh study found that 44 percent of surveyed experts believed that China could not achieve anything in Central Asia while only 20 percent believed China would be a major player in the region.
• The rapid increase in trade and energy projects between China and Central Asian countries have so far failed to translate into Chinese influence.
• In combating separatist and terrorist movements, Chinese leaders must note that using hard measures to suppressing unrests or crack down on activists cannot fully resolve the problems. Other soft measures are needed as well.
• Unless China has a clearer plan or policy to deepen its relations with Central Asian countries, Chinese influence will remain limited, and the region will continue to present challenges for China.